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Abstract
Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of
multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., “yes” and
“no”, every voting system can be described by a (monotone) Boolean function
χ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. However, its naive encoding needs 2n bits. The subclass
of threshold functions, which is sufficient for homogeneous agents, allows a more
succinct representation using n weights and one threshold. For heterogeneous
agents one can represent χ as an intersection of k threshold functions. Taylor
and Zwicker have constructed a sequence of examples requiring k ≥ 2n2−1 and
provided a construction guaranteeing k ≤ ( nbn/2c) ∈ 2n−o(n). The magnitude
of the worst case situation was thought to be determined by Elkind et al. in 2008,
but the analysis unfortunately turned out to be wrong. Here we uncover a relation
to coding theory that allows the determination of the minimum number for k for
a subclass of voting systems. As an application, we give a construction for k ≥
2n−o(n), i.e., there is no gain from a representation complexity point of view.
Keywords: simple games, weighted games, dimension, coding theory, Hamming
distance
MSC: 91B12, 91A12, 68P30
1 Introduction
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents whose binary preferences should be aggre-
gated to a group decision. We assume that voting is used as aggregation method, i.e.,
∗Research partially funded by Grant MTM 2012-34426 from the Spanish Economy and Competitiveness
Ministry.
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each agent can say either “yes” or “no”, which we encode by 1 and 0, respectively, to
a given proposal. The group decision then is an “accept” (1) or “reject” (0). Formally,
the used voting system can be modeled as a Boolean function χ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. By
imposing some, quite natural, additional constraints, we obtain the class of so-called
simple games, see Subsection 2.2. They are widely applied and very useful tools for
understanding decision making in political and other contexts. One major drawback is
that they do not admit an obvious succinct representation. The naive approach, listing
the function values of χ, needs 2n bits. Listing so-called minimal winning coalitions,
see Subsection 2.2, also needs 2n−o(n) items in the worst case.
However, the subclass of threshold functions of monotone Boolean functions or
weighted games of simple games, see Subsection 2.2, can be represented by just n in-
teger weights wi and an integer threshold/quota q. If a representation as a threshold
function/weighted games is possible, at most O(n log n) bits are needed for each inte-
ger, see [15]. In the case of homogeneous agents or players May’s theorem, see [14],
states that we can choose wi = 1 and 1 ≤ q ≤ n, i.e., a very succinct representation is
possible. In the case of heterogeneous agents or players there unfortunately are simple
games which are not weighted games if n ≥ 4. However, Taylor and Zwicker have
constructively shown that each simple game can be represented as the intersection of
at most
(
n
bn/2c
) ∈ 2n−o(n) weighted games, where the weights are either 0 or 1 and the
quotas are 1, see Subsection 2.2. The smallest number k such that a given simple game
Γ can be represented as the intersection of k weighted games is called the dimension
of Γ. From a representation complexity point of view we have the following important
questions:
How large can the dimension of a simple game be? And how can the corresponding
weighted games be constructed?
1.1 Related Work
With respect to the first question, Taylor and Zwicker provided a sequence of examples
requiring at least k ≥ 2n2−1 weighted games [16]. So, there is a large gap in the
knowledge of the magnitude of the worst case situation, which was thought to be closed
by Elkind et al. in 2008, see [4]. Unfortunately, their analysis is flawed, which we will
demonstrate in Section 3.
Taylor and Zwicker made the observation that although there are simple games with
arbitrarily large dimension, they do not seem to be used in real–world voting systems.
At the time of writing [16] the authors were only aware of practical voting systems with
a dimension of at least 2. Classical examples of dimension 2 are given by the Amend-
ment of the Canadian constitution [10] and the US federal legislative system [17]. The
voting systems of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong and the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union under its Treaty of Nice rules have a dimension of exactly three, which
was proven in [3, 6], respectively. Quite recently, the dimension of the voting system
of the Council of the European Union under its Treaty of Lisbon rules has a dimension
between 7 and 13 368 [11]. There, the authors also address the second question by
providing heuristic algorithms based on integer linear programming. Besides that, the
probably first published general approach for the determination of lower bounds for the
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dimension of a simple game is presented.
Instead of the intersection, each simple game can also be represented as a finite
union of weighted games, which leads to the notion of co–dimension, see e.g. [7].
Allowing arbitrary combinations of unions and intersections results in the concept of
a Boolean dimension, which is introduced and studied in [5]. We remark that the
voting system of the Council of the European Union under Lisbon rules has a Boolean
dimension of exactly three [11]. For the subclass of so-called complete simple or linear
games the dimension was studied in [8].
1.2 Our Contribution
We show up a link between the dimension of simple games and coding theory. More
precisely, we give a construction of a simple game from an error correcting code in-
cluding the determination of the corresponding exact dimension. Using results on er-
ror correcting codes we can conclude the existence of simple games whose dimension
asymptotically matches the worst case upper bound 2n−o(n) of Taylor and Zwicker,
i.e., we close the gap in the literature that was previously filled by the flawed result of
Elkind et al. [4].
We thoroughly discuss the lower bound construction of Taylor and Zwicker, i.e,
we determine the corresponding exact dimension. Curiously enough, just two different
integer weights of very small size are needed for the used weighted games. It turns
out that Elkind et al. considered an isomorphic variant of the example of Taylor and
Zwicker.
1.3 Outline
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 we introduce some notation and formally define the considered con-
cepts in the paper. We also state a well known theoretical upper bound for the dimen-
sion for later use in this section. The games that form the basis for our results are
introduced in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 contains the proofs of high dimension and a
theorem that forms the main contribution of the paper.
2 Preliminaries
We will start by briefly introducing error correcting codes for readers not familiar with
coding theory, see e.g. [2] for a more comprehensive introduction. In the second part
of this section we list the basic notation and definitions of simple games and their
dimension. Here we refer the interested reader to [16].
2.1 Error Correcting Codes
The Hamming weight hw(x) of a bit vector x ∈ {0, 1}n is the number of 1-bits in x:
hw(x) = |{i : xi = 1}|. The Hamming distance d(x, y) between two bit vectors x and
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y is the number of bit positions where the bits in x and y are different: d(x, y) = |{i :
xi 6= yi}|.
Imagine a situation where a 4 bit message has to be transmitted from a sender
to a receiver in a noisy environment where bits are risking to be flipped during the
transmission. By adding extra bits to the message in a clever way we can recover
the original message if a few bits are flipped. One way of doing this is by using the
well known Hamming[8,4] code where 4 bits are added as illustrated by the following
example:
Example 1. The Hamming[8,4] code is essentially the following setH of bit vectors:
H = {0000 0000, 0001 1110, 0010 0111, 0011 1001,
0100 1011, 0101 0101, 0110 1100, 0111 0010,
1000 1101, 1001 0011, 1010 1010, 1011 0100,
1100 0110, 1101 1000, 1110 0001, 1111 1111}
The set H contains 16 vectors – one vector for each possible 4 bit message where the
message is the first 4 bits of a vector. The 4 extra bits make it possible to recover a
message when bits are flipped.
The Hamming distance between any two vectors in H is at least 4. This means
that we can recover a message if one bit is flipped by locating the only vector in H
with Hamming distance 1 to the received message. If two bits are flipped we can only
detect that something bad has happened. This is a so called single error correcting and
double error detecting code — a SECDED code.
Let C8 = H \ {0000 0000, 1111 1111} denote the subset of H consisting of the 14
bit vectors with Hamming weight 4. The code C8 is referred to as a constant weight
code since all the members of C8 has the same Hamming weight. We will refer to C8
several places in the paper.
2.2 Simple Games and their Dimension
A simple game Γ = (N,W ) is a pair where N = {1, . . . , n}, for some positive integer
n, denotes the set of players or agents and W is a collection of subsets of N , i.e.,
W ⊆ 2N , satisfying the following conditions:
(1) ∅ /∈W ;
(2) N ∈W ;
(3) S ⊆ T ⊆ N and S ∈W implies T ∈W .
A coalition S is a subset of N . It is called winning if it is a member of W and it is said
to be losing otherwise.
The relation to a Boolean function χ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is given as follows: Let
S be the set of coordinates of the input vector x being equal to 1, i.e., all players that
vote “yes”. The players in N\S vote “no”. If χ(x) = 1, then S is winning and losing
otherwise.
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Conditions (1) and (2) and ensure that the group decision does not contradict the
individual preferences in the case of unanimity. The monotonicity condition (3) models
the assumption that an enlarged set of supporters should not turn the group decision
from an acceptance into rejection, which is quite reasonable. So a simple game Γ
corresponds to a monotone Boolean function χ with the extra conditions χ(0) = 0 and
χ(1) = 1.
Clearly, a simple game Γ is uniquely characterized by either its set W of winning
or its set L of losing coalitions, which may both be as large as 2n−1 in general. A first
reduction is possible: A coalitions S is called minimal winning if it is winning and all
of its proper subsets are losing. Similarly, a coalition T is called maximal losing if it is
losing and all of its proper supersets are winning. The family consisting of all minimal
winning coalitions is denoted by Wm and the family of all maximal losing coalitions
is denoted by LM . Since no minimal winning coalition is a proper subset of another
minimal winning coalition we can apply Sperner’s Lemma, see e.g. [12], to conclude
|Wm| ≤ ( nbn/2c). Similarly, we conclude ∣∣LM ∣∣ ≤ ( nbn/2c).
A simple game Γ = (N,W ) is weighted if there exists a quota q ∈ R>0 and
weights w1, w2, . . . , wn ∈ R≥0 such that S ∈ W if and only if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. We
remark that one can require the weights and the quota to be integers. The intersection
(N,W1) ∩ (N,W2) of two simple games is the simple game (N,W1 ∩W2). Taylor
and Zwicker [16] have shown that any simple game can be written as the intersection of
|LM |weighted games ΓT , T ∈ LM , where a coalition S wins in ΓT if S∩(N \T ) 6= ∅.
A weighted representation using weights 0 and 1 is given as follows: A player inN \T
has weight 1 and all other players have weight 0 in the game ΓT that has quota 1.
The dimension d of a simple game Γ is the smallest positive integer such that
Γ = ∩di=1Γd where the games Γi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, are weighted. From the previ-
ous considerations we conclude
d ≤ |LM | ≤ min
(
2n − |W |,
(
n
bn2 c
))
. (1)
To give an impression of how this upper bound relates to 2n we can use the the follow-
ing double inequality that holds for all even positive integers n [13]:√
2
pin
(
1− 1
4n
)
2n ≤
(
n
n
2
)
≤
√
2
pin
(
1− 2
9n
)
2n. (2)
For odd n, we can use
(
n
bn2 c
)
=
(n−1
n−1
2
)
2n
n+1 and obtain the following inequalities:(
n
bn2 c
)
≥ n
n+ 1
√
2
pi(n− 1)
(
1− 1
4(n− 1)
)
2n , (3)
(
n
bn2 c
)
≤ n
n+ 1
√
2
pi(n− 1)
(
1− 2
9(n− 1)
)
2n . (4)
For a bit vector x = x1x2 . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n with n bits we let Sx be the coalition
where i ∈ S if and only xi = 1. For a coalition S ⊆ N we define the bit vector
xS accordingly. We use the notation x¯ and S¯ for complements for bit vectors and sets
respectively.
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3 The Example of Taylor and Zwicker
Let us reconsider the construction of a simple game with large dimension from [16,
Theorem 1.7.5]. To this end, let k be an odd integer, S = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, T =
{k, k + 1, . . . , 2k − 1}, and N = S ∪ T . A coalition S ⊆ N is winning iff either
|X| ≥ k + 1 or |X| = k and |X ∩ T | ≡ 0 (mod 2). Denote the corresponding simple
game by Γk. The minimal winning coalitions of Γk are given by Wm ={
X1 ∪X2 | X1 ⊆ S,X2 ⊆ T, |X2| ≡ 0 (mod 2), |X1 ∪X2| = k
}
and the maximal losing coalitions of Γk are given by LM ={
X1 ∪X2 | X1 ⊆ S,X2 ⊆ T, |X2| ≡ 1 (mod 2), |X1 ∪X2| = k
}
.
Since k ≡ 1 (mod 2) we have n ≡ 2 (mod 4) for n = 2k = |N | and |Wm| =∣∣LM ∣∣ = 12 · ( nn/2) so that the dimension of Γk is at most 12 · ( nn/2). We remark that Γk
is self-dual, so that its dimension equals its co–dimension.
Theorem 1. For each odd integer k the dimension of Γk is given by 2k−1.
Proof. Let C =
{
xx : x ∈ {0, 1}k,∑ki=1 xi ≡ 0 (mod 2)}, where x denotes the
negation of a binary vector and xy denotes the concatenation of two binary vectors
x and y. We have C ⊆ LM , |C| = 2k−1 and we remark that the minimum Hamming
distance of C is 4 for k > 1.
For the lower bound on the dimension we refer to [16, Theorem 1.7.5].1
For the other direction set Cp =
{
x ∈ {0, 1}k : ∑ki=1 xi ≡ 0 (mod 2)}. Since
21−1 = 12 ·
(
2
1
)
we can assume k ≥ 3. We set v = ∩x∈Cpvx, where vx = [qx;wx1 , . . . , wx2k]
with
• wxi =
{
k − 1 : xi = 1,
k : xi = 0
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, wxj = k for all k+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k,
and qx = k2 − (wH(x)− 1) if x 6= 0;
• wxi = k for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,wxj = k−1 for all k+1 ≤ j ≤ 2k, and qx = k2−k+1
if x = 0.
Let S1 ⊆ N with |S1| ≥ k + 1. For each x ∈ Cp we have wx(S1) ≥ k(k − 1) + k =
k2 ≥ qx, so that S1 is winning in v. Now let S2 be a coalition with |S2| = k and
|S2 ∩ S| ≡ 0 (mod 2). If x is the characteristic vector of S2 ∩ S, then
• wx(S2) = wH(x) · (k − 1) + (k − wH(x)) · k = k2 − wH(x) < qx for x 6= 0;
• wx(S2) = k2 − k < qx for x = 0,
1Using the general approach and notation of [11] we can state a quick proof: For each x, y ∈ C with
x 6= y there exist indices 1 ≤ i ≤ k, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2k with xi 6= yi, xj 6= yj , and xi 6= xj . Negating xi,
xj , yi, and yj gives two winning vectors x′, y′ with x + y = x′ + y′, i.e., we have determined a 2-trade,
so that the dimension is at least 2k−1.
6
so that S2 is a losing coalition in v. Let S3 be a coalition with |S3| = k and |S3 ∩ S| ≡
1 (mod 2). For each x ∈ Cp there exists a player i ∈ S3 ∩ S with wxi = k, so that
wx(S3) ≥ wH(x) · (k− 1) + 1 + (k−wH(x)) · k = k2−wH(x) + 1 ≥ qx, so that S3
is winning in v. Finally, let S4 be a coalition of cardinality k − 1. Since k − 1 is even,
we have the following two cases:
• |S4 ∩ S| ≡ 0 (mod 2), |S4 ∩ T | ≡ 0 (mod 2),
• |S4 ∩ S| ≡ 1 (mod 2), |S4 ∩ T | ≡ 1 (mod 2).
In both cases it is possible to extend S4 to a coalition S5 ∈ LM by adding a player, so
that S4 has to be losing in v. Thus, we have v = χ′k and dim(χ
′
k) ≤ 2k−1.
Now let us restate the example of [4, Theorem 8]: Let k be an odd integer and
n = 2k, N = {1, . . . , n}. Consider the simple game χ˜k where all coalitions of
cardinality larger than k are winning and all coalitions of cardinality smaller than k
are losing. A coalition X of cardinality k is winning iff the Hamming distance be-
tween X and {1, . . . , k} is equivalent to 2 modulo 4. In other words, this means that
|X ∩ {1, . . . , k}| is even and |X ∩ {k + 1, . . . , n}| is odd.
Interchanging the first k players with the last k players yields the example of Taylor
and Zwicker. Since Theorem 8 in [4] claims that the dimension is at least
(
2k
k
)
/2, there
is a contradiction to Theorem 1. The flaw2 of the corresponding proof happens where
it is saying that if x is the bit vector of a losing coalition and xi 6= xj , then switching
xi and xj results in a bit vector of a winning coalition. An explicit counter example for
n = 6 is given by the characteristic vectors 100110 and 010110 which both represent
losing coalitions.
4 From Error Correcting Codes to Simple Games
In this section, we present a generic recipe for constructing the simple games forming
the basis for our results. Throughout the paper, we let C ⊆ {0, 1}n denote a set of bit
vectors of length n having positive Hamming weight satisfying this condition:
∀x 6= y ∈ C : |hw(x)− hw(y)| < d(x, y)− 2 (5)
For x ∈ C we define the simple game Γx with players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} as
follows: S wins in Γx if and only if S ∩ Sx 6= ∅. The simple game ΓC is now defined
by ΓC = ∩x∈CΓx. In other words, a set S is winning if and only if S is a so-called
hitting set for the collection of sets {Sx}x∈C .
The error correcting code C8 from Example 1 is a set of bit vectors satisfying (5).
Another example is the following:
Example 2. Let C be defined as follows for n = 8:
C = {0000 1111, 1100 0000, 0011 1100}
2We would like to thank Edith Elkind for directly pointing to the position where the proof breaks down
in a private communication.
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The Hamming weights of the vectors 0000 1111 and 1100 0000 differ by 2 but their
Hamming distance is 6. So (5) holds for these vectors. Coalition {1, 5} is winning
in ΓC since it intersects the sets {5, 6, 7, 8}, {1, 2} and {3, 4, 5, 6}. The bit vector
1000 1000 that corresponds to the set {1, 5} shares at least one 1-bit with all members
of C.
4.1 A Dimension Lemma
We now prove a lemma explicitly stating the dimension of our games.
Lemma 1. The dimension of ΓC is |C|.
Proof. The game Γx, x ∈ C, is clearly weighted so the dimension of ΓC is not higher
than |C|.
We now assume that the dimension of ΓC is less than |C|. Let Lx = N \ Sx for
x ∈ C. The coalition Lx is clearly a losing coalition in ΓC because Lx∩Sx = ∅. Using
the pigeonhole principle, we conclude that there are x, y ∈ C with x 6= y such that Lx
and Ly lose in the same weighted game Γ′ where Γ′ is one of the less than |C| weighted
games whose intersection is ΓC .
By considering basic properties for the Hamming distance and the Hamming weight
we observe that (5) also holds if we replace x and y with their complements x¯ and y¯.
If one of the vectors x¯ or y¯ had all 1-bits in the d(x¯, y¯) positions where the two vectors
differ then the left hand side of (5) would be d(x¯, y¯) and (5) would not hold. We there-
fore conclude that there are players px ∈ Lx \ Ly and py ∈ Ly \ Lx. We let A and B
be the coalitions obtained if Lx and Ly swap these players: A = (Lx \ {px}) ∪ {py}
and B = (Ly \ {py}) ∪ {px}.
We now show thatA andB are winning coalitions in ΓC . Without loss of generality,
we consider the coalition A. It is clear that xA and x share a 1-bit so A wins in Γx.
Now let us assume that there is a member z of C \ {x} such that A loses in Γz . In other
words, xA and z do not share a 1-bit. The vector xA is obtained by flipping a 0-bit and
a 1-bit in the vector x¯:
d(xA, z¯) ≥ d(x¯, z¯)− 2 . (6)
The d(xA, z¯) bits shared by xA and z are all 0 in which case we have the following:
d(xA, z¯) + hw(xA) + hw(z) = n . (7)
We now use hw(xA) = n− hw(x) together with (7):
d(xA, z¯) = hw(x)− hw(z) . (8)
By using d(x, z) = d(x¯, z¯) and (6) and (8) we obtain the following inequality:
hw(x)− hw(z) ≥ d(x, z)− 2 . (9)
Since (9) contradicts (5), we conclude that A wins in Γz for any z ∈ C. Consequently,
A also wins in ΓC .
Summing up, we now have two coalitions Lx and Ly that lose in Γ′ and we can
obtain two winning coalitions in ΓC if Lx and Ly swap two players. These coalitions
also win in Γ′ and we obtain a contradiction since this would mean that the total weight
in Γ′ of the players in Lx and Ly has increased.
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It is worth noting that the dimension of the game ΓC is |LM | since LM = {Lx}x∈C .
If we can construct games with dimension m using our approach we can also con-
struct games with dimension m′ for every m′ ≤ m as expressed by the following
corollary:
Corollary 1. Let ΓC be a simple game with n players and dimension m, then there are
simple games with n players and dimension m′, 1 ≤ m′ ≤ m.
Proof. Just delete some elements from C.
5 Simple Games with High Dimension
The key question we will deal with in this section is the following: Can we find fam-
ilies C of bit vectors with high cardinality satisfying (5)? According to Lemma 1, this
would automatically give us games with high dimension. From the theory on error cor-
recting codes we know how to construct relatively large families of bit vectors forming
SECDED constant weight codes. If we pick such a code we clearly have a family C
satisfying (5). This observation is the basis for the proofs in this section. As an ex-
ample, the code C8 from Example 1 corresponds to a simple game with 8 players and
dimension 14.
It is important to stress that constant weight SECDED codes are not the only fami-
lies satisfying the generic recipe (5) as illustrated by Example 2. There are many other
families that satisfy (5) but we will use constant weight SECDED codes to construct
our games with high dimension. In other words, there might be families with larger
cardinalities compared to constant weight SECDED codes satisfying (5).
Agrell et al. [1] present lower bounds for cardinalities of constant weight SECDED
codes. These lower bounds can be directly translated to lower bounds for dimensions
for simple games if we use Lemma 1. This allows us to set up Table 1 that compares the
dimensions of the games produced using composition of unanimity games [8] with the
dimensions of the games based on our approach and the lower bounds from [1]. The
first column displays n. The second column presents the dimensions of the games from
[8] and [16]. The third column contains the dimensions of the games produced using
our approach and constant weight SECDED codes. Finally, the last column shows the,
slightly improved, upper bound
(
n
bn/2c
) − 1.3 As an example, we can see that our
approach leads to a simple game with dimension 14 for n = 8 – the game ΓC8 .
We are now ready to consider all other values of n. Initially, we consider the case
where n is a power of 2. The following lemma generalizes the example described
earlier with |C8| = 14 for n = 8 to n = 2m for m ≥ 3.
Lemma 2. Let n = 2m where m is an integer, m ≥ 3. There is a set of bit vectors
C ⊆ {0, 1}n satisfying (5) with
|C| = 2
n
(
1
2
(
n
n
2
)
+ (n− 1)
(n
2 − 1
n
4
))
. (10)
3Sperner’s Theorem also classifies the cases where his bound is tight. Since all of the corresponding
simple games are indeed weighted, the previous upper bound can be reduced by 1.
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Table 1: A comparison of the dimensions of the games produced using composition of
unanimity games and the dimensions of the games based on our approach.
n Unanimity games Our approach
(
n
bn/2c
)− 1
6 4 4 19
7 4 7 34
8 8 14 69
9 9 18 125
10 16 36 251
11 18 66 461
12 32 132 923
13 36 166 1715
14 64 325 3431
15 81 585 6434
16 128 1170 12869
17 162 1770 24309
18 256 3540 48619
19 324 6726 92377
20 512 13452 184755
Proof. Let t = 2m − 1. The enumerator polynomial for an error correcting code
is a polynomial where the i’th coefficient, ai, is the number of bit vectors of Ham-
ming weight i. According to [18], the enumerator polynomial for the well known
Hamming[t,t−m] code that contains bit vectors of length t is:
A(x) =
(1 + x)t + t(1− x)(1− x2)(t−1)/2
t+ 1
.
Let i = t−12 (i = 2
m−1 − 1 is odd and i+ 1 is even) :
ai =
1
t+ 1
((
t
i
)
+ t(−1) i+12
(
i
i−1
2
))
ai+1 =
1
t+ 1
((
t
i+ 1
)
+ t(−1) i+12
(
i
i+1
2
))
= ai
The extended code Hamming[t+1,t−m] is a SECDED code. We can now let C be the
subset of the extended code containing the bit vectors with Hamming weight n2 . This
is a constant weight SECDED code satisfying (5).
Set n = t + 1 = 2i + 2. The number of bit vectors in the extended code with
Hamming weight n2 = i+ 1 is ai + ai+1 = 2ai+1:
2ai+1 =
2
n
((
n− 1
n
2
)
+ (n− 1)(−1)n4
(n
2 − 1
n
4
))
For n ≥ 8 we have:
2ai+1 =
2
n
((
n− 1
n
2
)
+ (n− 1)
(n
2 − 1
n
4
))
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We now use (
n
n
2
)
=
(
n− 1
n
2
)
+
(
n− 1
n
2 − 1
)
= 2
(
n− 1
n
2
)
to obtain
2ai+1 =
2
n
(
1
2
(
n
n
2
)
+ (n− 1)
(n
2 − 1
n
4
))
.
We now state our main theorem where we also consider values of n that are not
powers of 2.
Theorem 2. For any positive integer n there is a simple game with n players and
dimension d satisfying:
d ≥ 1
n
(
n
bn2 c
)
. (11)
If n = 2m for an integer m ≥ 3 then there is a simple game with n players and
dimension d such that
d =
1
n
(
n
n
2
)
+
2(n− 1)
n
(n
2 − 1
n
4
)
. (12)
Proof. Graham and Sloane [9] have shown that there is constant weight SECDED code
with Hamming weight w with cardinality at least 1n
(
n
w
)
for any w. For w = bn2 c we
get (11) by using Lemma 1. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 give us (12).
It follows from (2) and (3) that the lower bound presented in Theorem 5 is 2n−o(n).
Our games are easily seen to be within a factor n from the upper bound from (1).
Finally, we point out that the proof of the lower bound in [9] is constructive.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a link from coding theory to the dimension of simple games. We
are not aware of any other connection between coding theory and simple games. While
it seems a rather tough problem to determine the exact dimension of a simple game, in
Lemma 1 we have provided an exact formula for those simple games arising from error
correcting codes. Via this connection any improvement on lower bounds of constant
weight codes improves the stated lower bounds for the worst case dimensions of simple
games. For the other direction it would be interesting to know whether unrestricted
codes satisfying Inequality (5) have some application in coding theory. Till now it is
even unclear, at least to us, if those codes can be strictly larger than constant weight
codes. From our point of view this connection should be explored in more detail.
The asymptotic magnitude of the worst case examples with respect to the dimension
of simple games is determined, which closes a gap in the literature and uncovers a flaw
in a previous attempt. The bad news are that from a representation complexity point of
view the usage of intersections of weighted games can not be a solution for all cases.
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From a practical point of view one may nevertheless ask whether the set of weighted
games with small dimension are not too far apart from the set of simple games, so that
there is no reason to use high-dimensional simple games in reality.
From a mathematical point of view it would be interesting to determine the exact
values of the worst case examples.
The construction of the representing weighted games is still widely open and de-
serves further attention.
References
[1] E. Agrell, A. Vardy, and K. Zeger, ‘Upper bounds for constant-weight codes’,
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 46, 2373–2395, (2000).
[2] E.R. Berlekamp, Algebraic Coding Theory: Revised Edition, World Scientific,
2015.
[3] W.-S. Cheung and T.-W. Ng, ‘A three-dimensional voting system in Hong Kong’,
European Journal of Operational Research, 236(1), 292–297, (2014).
[4] E. Elkind, L. A. Goldberg, P. W. Goldberg, and M. Wooldridge, ‘On the dimen-
sionality of voting games’, in Proc. 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, pp. 69–74. AAAI Press, (2008).
[5] P. Faliszewski, E. Elkind, and M. Wooldridge, ‘Boolean combinations of
weighted voting games’, in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on
Autonomous Agen ts and Multiagent Systems, pp. 185–192. International Foun-
dation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, (2009).
[6] J. Freixas, ‘The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules’,
European Journal of Operational Research, 156(2), 415–419, (2004).
[7] J. Freixas and D. Marciniak, ‘On the notion of dimension and codimension’, in
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference Game Theory and Ma nagement,
eds., Leon A. Petrosyan and Nikolay A. Zenkevich, pp. 67–81. The International
Society of Dynamic Games (Russian Chapter), (2010).
[8] J. Freixas and M.A. Puente, ‘A note about games-composition dimension’, Dis-
crete Applied Mathematics, 113(23), 265–273, (2001).
[9] R.L. Graham and N.J.A. Sloane, ‘Lower bounds for constant weight codes.’,
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 26(1), 37–43, (1980).
[10] D.M. Kilgour, ‘A formal analysis of the amending formula of Canada’s Consti-
tution Act, 1982’, Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de
Science Politique, 16, 771–777, (1983).
[11] S. Kurz and S. Napel, ‘Dimension of the lisbon voting rules in the EU Council: a
challenge and new world record’, Optimization Letters, 1–12, (2015). to appear.
12
[12] D. Lubell, ‘A short proof of Sperner’s lemma’, Journal of Combinatorial Theory,
1(2), 299–299, (1966).
[13] Y.L. Luke, The special functions and their approximations, Academic Press New
York, 1969.
[14] K.O. May, ‘A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple
majority decision’, Econometrica, 680–684, (1952).
[15] S. Muroga, Threshold logic and its applications, New York etc.: Wiley-
Interscience, a Division of John Wiley &amp; So ns, Inc. XIV,478 p., 1971.
[16] A.D. Taylor and W.S. Zwicker, Simple games: desirability relations, trading, and
pseudoweightings, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA, 1999.
[17] Alan Taylor and William Zwicker, ‘Weighted voting, multicameral representa-
tion, and power’, Games and Economic Behavior, 5(1), 170–181, (1993).
[18] S.B. Wicker, Error Control Systems for Digital Communication and Storage,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 1995.
13
